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judgment via the substitution of judgement criteria more readily accessible to laypeople.
Based on evidence about how expert judgment actually functions, we propose utility as a
standard accessible to all. We show this by describing a historiographic model of expert
judgment within the research university. We close with a call for scholars to acknowledge
the conflation of facts and values in their work—that is, its post-truth nature.
Keywords: conservative critique; higher education; utility; expert judgment; pragmatism
El profesorado y la era de la posverdad: Un análisis historiográfico del juicio de
especialistas y la desestabilización de la verdad objetiva
Resumen: Este artículo explora el papel de la desconfianza en el juicio de expertos en
revisiones conservadoras de la enseñanza superior. Proponemos que los académicos
abandonen la insistencia en el estándar para la evaluación de la calidad de la investigación.
Hacerlo sería una crítica conservadora distinta del más fácilmente accesible al tipo. Con
base en la evidencia de lo hábilmente hablando, proponemos la utilidad como un estándar
accesible a todos. Lo mostramos describiendo un modelo historiográfico de juicio de
especialistas dentro de la universidad de investigación. Concluimos con un llamamiento a
los estudiosos para que reconozcan los hechos de su trabajo -es decir, su naturaleza
posverdad.
Palabras clave: conservative critique; enseñanza superior; utilidad; juicio de expertos;
pragmatismo
O professorado e a era da pós-verdade: Uma análise historiográfica do juizo de
especialistas e a desestabilização da verdade objetiva
Resumo: Este artigo explora o papel da desconfiança no juizo de especialistas em revisões
conservadoras do ensino superior. Propomos que os acadêmicos abandonem a insistência
no padrão para a avaliação da qualidade da pesquisa. Fazê-lo seria uma crítica
conservadora distinta do mais facilmente acessível ao tipo. Com base na evidência de quão
habilmente falando, nós propomos a utilidade como um padrão acessível a todos.
Mostramos isso descrevendo um modelo historiográfico de julgamento de especialistas
dentro da universidade de pesquisa. Concluímos com um apelo aos estudiosos para que
reconheçam os fatos de seu trabalho - isto é, sua natureza pós-verdade.
Palavras-chave: crítica conservadora; ensino superior; utilidade; juizo de especialistas;
pragmatismo

The Professoriate and the Post-Truth Era: A Historiographic Analysis of
Expert Judgment and the Destabilization of Objective Truth
For nearly four centuries, higher education institutions have been depicted by both academic
and political leaders as serving desirable societal ends (e.g., Dorn, 2017; Geiger, 2015). Throughout
most of this history, however, faculty members have also worked to establish and defend claims of
specialized knowledge and vital expertise (Geiger, 1993, 2004). By the mid-1960s, these efforts had
resulted in the full professionalization of the professoriate (Labaree, 2017; Rudolph, 1977). Within a
professionalized professoriate, faculty members found their primary affinity with their discipline
more often than their institution; found it difficult to gain employment without a doctoral or
relevant professional degree; became more mobile throughout their careers; and often completed the
abrogation of responsibility for students’ non-academic lives as their work lives increasingly focused
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on research, teaching, and service—with research typically the most highly prized of these
responsibilities (Schuster & Finklestein, 2006).
Notably, however, the final transition to faculty-as-professionals rather than faculty-aseducators occurred at precisely the same time that the profound social and political dislocations of
the student protest movements arrived on American college campuses (cf. Boren, 2001; Jencks &
Riesman, 1968). The result of these overlapping sea changes in the normal operation of colleges and
universities saw voices across the political spectrum offer vociferous critiques of higher education
(Hartman, 2016; Prothero, 2017). For liberal students and politicians, colleges and universities had
grown far too cozy with the military-industrial complex and delivered a curriculum that ignored the
experiences of minoritized persons (e.g., Acuña, 2011; Biondi, 2012; Carney, 1999; Ferguson, 2012;
Plummer, 2013; Rojas, 2007). For conservative students and politicians, these liberal objections
provided a foil for long-running objections to the perceived radicalism of the academy (e.g.,
Critchlow, 2011; Nash, 1976; Patterson, 1996, 2005). Ironically, the commonly held assumption that
colleges and universities existed in service to society made them the perfect rhetorical battleground
in the Culture Wars, a series of asymmetrical debates that have long sought to define core American
values (e.g., Hartman, 2016; Petrzela, 2017; Prothero, 2017).
Historians of higher education have documented the histories of student protests, political
debates over the nature of the higher education, and structural changes to colleges and universities
(e.g., Boren, 2001; Labaree, 2017; Loss, 2012; Thelin, 2011). Notably, however, historians have rarely
systematically interrogated the interplay between these three historical narratives and the evolving
nature of faculty work. As a result, we contend in this article that social scientists have not fully
understood one of the key proximate causes for persistent contradictory findings about public
support for higher education: the shift to a fully professionalized faculty dominated by expert
judgment, a form of expertise with which some Americans have long felt discomfort (cf. Jencks &
Riesman, 1968; Hofstadter, 1963). In this article, we contend that the simultaneous discomfort with
and enthusiasm for higher education displayed by both liberals and conservatives stems from the
opacity of the academic knowledge production process—from how research is funded to the
technical language used to convey results to the limited ways that truth claims can be made—to
virtually everyone not extensively trained in the academy in the same or in a closely related field.
That is, both liberal and conservative critics of higher education hold that college and universities
have ignored their responsibilities to “Truth” (cf. Hartman, 2016; Prothero, 2017) without clearly
defining the term or recognizing that academics may use it in markedly different ways than they do.
Moreover, we contend that academics might have exacerbated the potential for distrust by
failing to address critiques of higher education when they occurred and by refusing to clarify their
theoretical vocabularies when called to account for their lack of ready intelligibility. To address this
problem, we examine the contemporary debate around truth in both contemporary political
discourse and in the academy. Notably, we show that claims of a post-truth era—particularly as it
pertains to higher education—might well be overstated. We also demonstrate that most academics
have a more tenuous claim to truth than they might otherwise claim. We next demonstrate the
origins of these problems by tracing the historiography of expert judgment in the professions and of
conservative critiques of higher education. We show that many of these conservative critiques
actually respond to substantive issues arising from the very nature of expert judgment. Finally, we
argue that these issues can be addressed by adopting the approach to truth advocated by Rortian
pragmatism.
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Post-Truth in Contemporary Discourse
Anxiety over the status of truth is a long-standing mainstay in contemporary American social
and political discourse. However, concerns about truth have reached fever-pitch since the 2016
presidential campaign and election, amidst presidential declarations of alternative facts and accusations
of deceit and misinformation targeting media outlets. Perhaps as a result of the anxiety created by
these accusations, there has been concomitant concern over the role that discursive moments such
as the Culture Wars might have had in creating the conditions under which fake news was able to
emerge. In other words, many people have wondered whether concepts like cultural relativism are to
blame for the president’s—and others’—ability to claim that opposing views are simply misinformed
or untrue. Indeed, there seems to have been an intensification of these anxieties not only over what
is generally agreed upon as true, but also over the institutions that American society typically looks
to that help discern what is and is not true—the media, government bodies, and experts
(Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016).
In the realm of education, one of the primary effects of this discourse concerning truth and
expertise is the delegitimization of higher education. Institutions of higher education house experts
in many different fields, the majority of whom produce research on issues that they believe are both
relevant and beneficial to American society. However, the past several decades have seen a gradual
increase in suspicion of and disregard for higher education (e.g., Gross, 2013; Grossmann &
Hopkins, 2016). This suspicion is built, in part, from a conservative concern about an institution
viewed largely as a space built by and for liberal intellectuals and wherein these same liberal
intellectuals, in their roles as faculty members, might indoctrinate future voters (Gross, 2013).
Reflecting this line of argument, most Republicans now believe that American universities negatively
influence the country (Pew Research Center, 2017). This sentiment has increased within the past two
years, coinciding with conservative political ascendance and rhetoric about fake news (Pew Research
Center, 2017). Liberals, on the other hand, view higher education more favorably and typically hold
that scientific and social scientific inquiry lead to the betterment of society via the production of new
knowledge about social reality (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016). Although simplified here, these views
misunderstand both the aims of much academic research and actual scholarly debates about the
nature of objectivity, subjectivity, and truth. Both of these views posit the existence of T/truth,
identify the academy as a location where T/truth could be found and verified, and question whether
trust can be safely placed with so-called experts. It is this complicated nexus of concerns about what
constitutes the truth, suspicion of those traditionally entrusted with the truth, and the academy as a
mistrusted site of truth that we interrogate in this article through an exploration of conservative
critiques of higher education.

Post-Truth in the Philosophy of (Social) Science
Academics who study knowledge production in the natural and social sciences have
consistently noted that there are profound discrepancies between the way that the scientific method
is described in theory and the way it functions in practice (e.g., Feyerabend, 2010; Fine, 1996; Kuhn,
1996; Latour, 2010). Although the scientific method is typically regarded as a systematic approach to
rigorous inquiry, the actual production of scientific knowledge, if often chaotic, and the utilization of
scientific knowledge typically requires a mixture of professional expertise, popular sentiment, and
political agency (e.g., Bowker & Star, 2000; Hacking, 1990; Latour, 1988, 2012; Porter, 1995). That
problem is further exacerbated in the social sciences, where the connection between knowledge
production and knowledge can be complicated by the involvement of human beings (e.g., Giddens,
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1984; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979). Recognizing these differences, we regard the scientific method as
the basic form of inquiry in both science-related fields and social science fields that seek to create
experiments, quasi-experiments, or other conditions under which causal attributions can be made. In
light of this focus, we use this section to show that two shifts—one being the shift from the
conceptualization to the execution of the scientific method and the other being the shift from the
production to the use of scientific knowledge—results in the conflation of what are, technically
speaking, incommensurable truth claims (Feyerabend, 2010). To demonstrate how these
incommensurable truth claims function, we first describe the shift from positivism to
postpositivism. We then describe how both empirical findings about scientific work and
philosophical discussions of truth produce considerable ambiguity within scientific practice. Finally,
we suggest that the resultant scientific practice is a fundamentally pragmatic one.
Virtually all definitions of the scientific method include the same features: the formulation,
testing, and revision of hypotheses; systematic observation and measurement; and the use of
experimental methods (e.g., Carey, 2011; Gauch, 2002; Gower, 1996). However, although both
scientists and the general public would likely agree that these features are critical to good science,
they would likely diverge with regard to the end product of scientific inquiry. The public
conceptualization of science emphasizes the pursuit of universal truths (big “T” Truths), which is
how originators of the scientific method from antiquity until the mid-1900s would also likely have
framed their work (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). However, since the Popperian Revolution, scientific
inquiry has been oriented toward falsification rather than Truth (Sigmund, 2017). According to this
formulation, scientific inquiry can never demonstrate conclusively that something is “True” but
rather when things are “Not True” (Popper, 1959/2002). Notably, however, the movement toward
Truth remains the goal. That is to say that, under experimental conditions, the results of one’s
inquiry show merely that one particular set of conditions results in a particular outcome. It cannot
show conclusively why or how that occurs—although further experiments can help to rule out
potential explanations while also marking others as more or less plausible. With sufficient evidence,
scientists begin to treat the explanations that they generate as small “t” true while also
acknowledging they do so only provisionally. Importantly, this distinction between truth and Truth
can easily be forgotten in practice and is often missed entirely by non-scientists (cf. Kuhn, 1996;
Neal, Smith, & McCormick, 2008).
In an attempt to describe how knowledge production functions in general and in science
specifically, some pragmatist philosophers have suggested that utility might be a more useful
criterion for evaluating science than is truth (James, 1907/1981, 1909/1978). For pragmatists, utility
is used to capture the capacity of an idea to generate understanding or to solve a problem of
practical significance. This understanding of utility is predicated on the recognition that universal
claims—that is, statements of big “T” Truth—can never be substantiated and that continuing to use
the word truth to describe the results of inquiry is, therefore, problematic. Instead, pragmatists hold
that both individuals and society as a whole have ever-evolving narratives that they use to explain
observations of the world (Rorty & Engel, 2007). As new observations call into question prior
knowledge, this narrative is adjusted continuously. Understandings that comprise the pragmatist’s
narrative reality are inherently useful. They enable prediction of future events and explanation of
past ones, but they are also subject to ongoing reevaluation and, according to Rortian pragmatism
(Rorty, 1990, 1999), do not reflect meaningfully an objective reality but rather a socially constructed
one. That is, once falsified, accounts of reality must be replaced by new explanations, which are
always mediated by human experience. In other words, Rortian pragmatism recognizes that the
things people label as true are, in fact, merely a story connecting those ideas that are not false.
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Historiography of Expert Judgment
As we have shown, concerns about truth are widespread in both social and political
discourse and in the philosophy of social science. These concerns both reflect and contribute to a
foundational anxiety over the role and power of expert judgment in American society. In this
section, we construct a brief historiography of expert judgment by drawing on two critical and
interconnected histories: the development of professions and professionalization and the
development of an American bureaucratic system. Exploring these historical developments provides
several answers to the question of why Americans mistrust expert judgment quite so much: the
democratic nature of the United States, the distance between those who are experts and those who
are effected by expert decisions, and the persistent thread of anti-intellectualism that cycles
throughout American history.
Professions: Breadth versus Depth
While the traditional professions (e.g., the clergy, law, or medicine) emerged in the late
medieval and early modern era, professionalization sped up and hit its stride in the United States in
the late 19th century (Siegrist, 2015). Broadly speaking, occupations become professions through
parallel processes that involve, on the one hand, demarcation of specialized knowledge (Bowker &
Star, 2000) and, on the other, developments on the social, political, and cultural levels (Siegrist,
2015). Typically, in order for a job to be considered a profession, there needs to be a well-defined
body of knowledge over which the profession has control—both in terms of what the knowledge is
and who has access to it—autonomy over their working environment, and a commitment to service
to the public through their profession (Goldstein, 1984; Hatch, 1988; Siegrist, 2015). Additionally,
professions require credibility; more often than not, that credibility is protected by requiring
members to be certified by an institution, such as the state, legislation, or a higher education
institution (Goldstein, 1984; Hatch, 1988; Siegrist, 2015). To a certain extent, this professionalization
occurred due to the expansion of the capitalist state—there were more customers and more demand
for goods and services (Siegrist, 2015). In the 20th century, the underclass created by a capitalist
system required medical and social services, which led to increased professionalization for those
realms, such as nurses or social workers (Siegrist, 2015).
Higher education has been deeply involved with the professionalizing process. As mentioned
previously, professionalization requires institutions to confer legitimacy. In the European context,
this role was often played by the state, but higher education fulfilled that role in the United States
(Hatch, 1988). It is no coincidence that, just as professionalization was increasing speed, research
universities also emerged (Geiger, 1986). For research universities to emerge as a predominant
institutional type, there needed to be both a proliferation of specialized subject matter over which
people could become experts and increased proliferation of the idea that colleges should prepare
students for careers, especially those in the burgeoning American corporate world (Geiger, 1986).
Indeed, the university system was integral in the creation of esoteric bodies of knowledge that form
one of the pillars of professionalization; this phenomenon was fueled by the creation of academic
disciplines, communities, and associations (Geiger, 1986). The combined effect of the foundation of
land-grant universities and the spread of the elective system meant that professional training became
subsumed under higher education’s umbrella and the university became an institution that creates
professions, legitimates their expert judgment, and ultimately obscures the process by which that
judgment is produced (Geiger, 1986; Lindblom & Cohen, 1979). These developments were firmly in
place by the 20th century and only became more deeply entrenched with the influx of federal and
industrial money after both world wars (Geiger, 2004; Jencks & Riesman, 1968). However, it was
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not until the Academic Revolution of the 1960s that the supply of high-qualified faculty members
fully met the demands of colleges and universities (Jencks & Riesman, 1968; Thelin, 2011), which
catalyzed a shift in the nature of faculty work from primarily institution-based to primarily disciplinebased (Schuster & Finklestein, 2006). That is, following the 1960s, most faculty members began to
see themselves as disciplinary experts within professions rather than educators within institutions.
The effects of professionalization shaped the experiences of people ranging far beyond those
who did the work—indeed, these effects emanated throughout society with profound consequences
for the ways that people thought about themselves and professionals. Porter (1995) discussed
professionalization and the development of the standard of objectivity in conjunction with each
other. Professions such as actuaries and engineers developed objective standards in the face of
public mistrust—evidence that this concern over expert judgment is of long standing (Porter, 1995).
Rather than submitting to public scrutiny and knowledge, these privileged workers formed
professions to maintain control over information and sought to expand the power of these
professions (Porter, 1995). Goldstein (1984), in reconciling Foucault’s (1975/1995) disciplinary
theory with the traditional sociological account of professionalization, argued that the men (as they
so often were) who carried out the disciplinary mechanisms were also those whose occupations were
in the process of professionalizing, such as doctors, psychiatrists, and teachers. This
conceptualization puts the professions in partnership with the state as it developed bureaucratic
systems to manage and to preserve populations (Goldstein, 1984).
Bureaucracy: Managing Complexity
The late 19th century found American culture and society, like its systems of knowledge and
work, becoming increasingly complex. The changes caused by the scientific and industrial
revolutions increased the potential complexity of social and technological problems (Cowan, 1997),
which meant that no single person could possess the knowledge to solve them. This growth in
complexity in combination with the emergence of a money economy gave rise to the modern
bureaucracy, especially in the context of a modern mass democracy (Nelson, 1982; Weber, 1947).
Bureaucracy, in turn, rested on the availability and willingness of experts not only to fulfill their
calling to service but also to place themselves as experts capable of solving social problems
(Lindblom & Cohen, 1979). Ultimately, the combination of professional expertise and bureaucratic
management had a profound effect on the way that the public perceives expert judgment in a
democratic context.
Similar to the history of professionalization, understanding bureaucracies has its roots in
classical sociology, but can be complicated by later poststructuralist developments. O’Neill (1986)
deftly synthesized Weber’s formal analysis of bureaucracy with Foucault’s discursively produced
bodies. Although Foucault and Weber understood rationalization differently, they both contend that
bureaucratization is part of the rationalization of society (O’Neill, 1986). In many ways, Foucault
grounds the Weberian analysis in its effects on the bodies of individuals within a bureaucratic
society—in other words, the effects of a legal-rational bureaucratic system are played out physically
in the discipline of bodies (O’Neill, 1986). These disciplinary strategies are often carried out through
either the social sciences or professions legitimized by the social sciences, such as education, social
work, management, or the prison industry (O’Neill, 1986). In many ways, professionalization fueled
the bureaucratization of society, whereas the emergent bureaucracy demanded more professionals.
Democracy and its Discontents
The interconnectedness of professionalization and bureaucratization has had a profound
effect on the ways that Americans understand and trust expert judgment—or, rather, the ways that
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they do not trust expert judgment. This mistrust is also connected to the distance that is in place
between experts and non-experts and the long history of American anti-intellectualism.
As shown earlier, professionalization and bureaucratization involve both the exertion of
control and autonomy over bodies of knowledge and the use of that knowledge to administer the
state and the people within it. Through the end of the 19th century and into the 20th century, these
processes increasingly fell under the purview of higher education. Research universities especially
came to the fore in the proliferation of professions and the production of students to work in those
professions (Geiger, 1986). These processes also removed decision-making from the realm of the
quotidian—in other words, they introduced more distance between everyday people and the
mechanisms that control their lives (Porter, 1995). Indeed, part of the professionalizing and
bureaucratizing efforts was the concomitant institutionalization of objectivity as a hallmark of
modern science (Porter, 1995). Quantification, objectivity, and their connection to impersonality was
at once a tool to deal with distance and distrust and a way of creating that same distance for
different audiences (Porter, 1995).
A key aspect of this historiography is its American context—both professionalization and
bureaucratization took different routes in other countries. This context means that the development
of the professions and the bureaucracy has occurred amidst American democracy and its deepseated mistrust of elitism (Hatch, 1988; Hofstadter, 1963; Jacoby, 2008). This mistrust is neither
overt nor unrelenting but is instead expressed in ambivalence and unease as well as cyclical
fluctuations in levels of anti-intellectualism (Hatch, 1988; Hofstadter, 1963). Anti-intellectualism has
taken several forms, ranging from general mistrust of experts to outright hostility towards
universities (Hofstadter, 1963; Jacoby, 2008). Hofstadter (1963) saw anti-intellectualism’s longevity
linked to both the good intentions of its progenitors (e.g., the Great Awakening) and the fact that
modern society will simply no longer function without experts, belying the long-standing myth of
American self-sufficiency (Cowan, 1997). Notably, however, the 1960s saw a critical shift in the
nature of this anti-intellectualism. What had been primarily a classed discourse (e.g., people with
more education defended the idea of expertise, people with less education dismissed it) became a
multivalent critique when conservative pundits began aggressively pursuing anti-intellectualism for
political gain (e.g., Critchlow, 2011; Nash, 1976) and liberal intellectuals were forced to confront the
high-profile failure of expert judgment in policy disasters such as school busing and the Vietnam
War (e.g., Chomsky, 2002; Delmont, 2016; Formisano, 2004; Halberstam, 1972). Because experts are
both produced by and housed in universities, anti-intellectualist attention most often focused on
higher education.

Reinterpretation of Conservative Critique Based on Historiography
As described in the prior section, the depersonalized, unknowable nature of truth in modern
society feeds into the distrust of expert judgment that pervades all segments of American society.
Conservative commentators (e.g., Buckley, 1951; D’Souza, 1991; Sykes, 1990) have long-attempted
to weaponize this lack of faith in expert judgment in order to frame liberal political values as
problematic and to erode trust in institutions generally and universities specifically. This elision of
concerns over expert judgment and faculty politics can be seen via an analysis of key texts written by
conservatives during the Culture Wars. In this section, we show this process in operation using an
analysis of Bloom’s (1987) The Closing of the American Mind. We then use examples drawn from other
conservative works positioned as part of the Culture Wars to show that these critiques collectively
display a deep skepticism about the wisdom of professionals, which they ground in an espoused
belief in objectivity and a stated objection to the conflation of facts and values. They also frequently
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posit that the skills and content for a better educational model can be found in the “great book,”
which substitutes the decisions of a large number of contemporaneous experts for the past
judgment of a far more limited subset of minds.
Closing of the American Mind
Reacting to the threat that postmodernism posed to academic knowledge, Bloom (1987)
suggested that there was only one possible solution: a fixed canon. Further, he argued that the only
plausible foundation for that canon was the great books, a “generally recognized” collection of
“classic texts” (p. 344), including works focused on “philosophy, theology, the literary classics, and
on those scientists like Newton, Descartes, and Leibniz . . . [which] must help preserve what is most
likely to be neglected in a democracy . . . not dogmatisms but precisely the opposite: what is
necessary to fight dogmatism” (p. 254). This quotation displays the fundamental essentialism and
pretense to objectivity of most conservative critiques of higher education.
First, Bloom (1987) argued that a fixed canon centered on the great books presents valueladen content in domains ranging from philosophy to physics as merely neutral content that can
function at the catalyst and content for meaningful communication. According to Bloom (1987):
. . . tradition is unambiguous; its meaning is articulated in simple, rational speech that
is immediately comprehensible and powerfully persuasive to all normal human
beings. America tells one story: the unbroken, ineluctable progress of freedom and
equality. [. . .] But the unity, grandeur, and attendant folklore of the founding heritage
was attacked from so many directions in the last half-century that it gradually
disappeared from daily life and from textbooks. (p. 55)
Here, Bloom responded directly to the critiques levied by liberal students and faculty members
about the inattention of the academy to minoritized voices by denying the reality of their
experiences. By equating American history with “freedom and equality” (p. 55), Bloom made clear
that he—like many conservative commentators on higher education—believes that there is but one
singular experience of reality: his own.
Second, Bloom’s work recalls long-running formulations of academic work that decenter the
role of faculty members and assign the development of useful skills—such as the capacity to fight
dogmatism—to the right kind of books (e.g., Potts, 2010; Reynolds, 2002; Sugrue, 1994). In this
formulation, books are valuable because they pose difficult questions about the past and the
present—and because they can represent common ground. In challenging us, they foster a mental
discipline that has value in the “search for a good life,” which Bloom (1987) argued is the goal of an
education (p. 34). Education then is a means to equip human beings for the constant striving for
improvement that makes them “fully human” (p. 38). Notably, in his formulation of the great books
curriculum, Bloom (1987) even argued against the presence of disciplines—warning the reader
against “forcing them [books] into categories we make up” (p. 344). In making these claims, Bloom
directly undercut the move toward expert judgment that anchors the modern systems of higher
education. According to Bloom’s reasoning, no specialized disciplinary knowledge is required to
confront difficult works, such as Newton’s and Leibniz’s original works on calculus, nor is the
guidance of a faculty intermediary necessary. Instead, a person need only encounter these works as
Bloom has and then they will presumably think as Bloom does, which is a mode of thought Bloom
enjoys a great deal.
Finally, Bloom clarified that a great books curriculum serves as a guard against the
postmodern slide by inviting students to think deeply and holistically about the human condition.
For example, Bloom argued that: “Cultural relativism succeeds in destroying the West's universal or
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intellectually imperialistic claims, leaving it to be just another culture” and fosters a false appearance
of openness that “denies the special claim of reason” to help determine that which is true (p. 39).
According to Bloom, the great books function as a shared topic and media for communication while
also providing people the skills with which to reason. In his estimation, without this foundation,
society might not have a meaningful way to communicate nor have things worth discussing. Bloom
(1987) argued that education inculcates similar values—“man’s natural rights”—and that these
similar values provide a “fundamental basis of unity and sameness” that causes differences to
“disappear or become dim when bathed in the light of natural rights, which give men common
interests and make them truly brothers” (p. 27). For those who differ from Bloom’s perceived norm,
that is an irredeemably problematic position in its attention to the value of human diversity.
A Broad Context for Conservative Critique
Bloom’s (1987) critique of higher education advanced a singular view of both the role of
higher education and the nature of society that can be seen across conservative critiques both prior
to and subsequent to his work. This perspective holds that teaching the right sort of materials
creates useful habits of mind and further delineates the bearer of that education as part of a cultural
in-group. As in Bloom’s formulation, most conservative critiques of colleges and university curricula
center on the perceived lack of focus on the classics—in Anderson’s (1992) framing: “It is difficult
to improve on Aristotle, Shakespeare, or Adam Smith.” (p. 119). Notably, the conservative
definition for the great books results in a curriculum populated almost entirely by books written by
White, European men. Most conservative commentators do not ever really address the issue of
representation or distinguish whether these books deliver a small “t” truth or a big “T’ Truth. When
they do so, they typically follow D’Souza’s (1991) reasoning: “It is in liberal education, properly
devised and understood, that minorities and indeed all students will find the means for their true and
permanent emancipation” (p. 23). This line of argument holds that the world is built upon a
particular set of values and approaches—those developed by and for affluent White men—and the
only way to become a full participant in that world is to internalize those values.
The essentialism and pretense to objectivity inherent in the conservative critique of higher
education can also be seen in advocacy for a great books education as a form of cultural literacy,
which is itself seen as vital for economic success and full democratic participation. The plainest
statement of this belief comes from Charles Sykes (1988), who wrote: “Without apology, the
undergraduate curriculum should be centered on the intellectual tradition of Western civilization.
Quite simply, there are certain books and certain authors that every college graduate should read if
he is to be considered truly educated” (p. 260). Like most conservative arguments regarding cultural
literacy, this depiction relies on the essentialist assumption that knowledge is real and fixed—one
either possesses it or does not. Consequently, a lack of familiarity with the most important of this
knowledge becomes an unforgiveable intellectual sin. As D’Souza (1991) wrote: “The study of other
cultures can never compensate for a lack of thorough familiarity with the founding principles of
one’s own culture” (p. 255). Notably, in order to function effectively, this critique of cultural
pluralism as a form of cultural relativism functions to provide an inherently limited perspective on
what can and what cannot count as a legitimate form of knowledge.
Conservative commentators skirt the issue of cultural pluralism by reframing cultural literacy
as democracy: as Roger Kimball (1990) stated, an education in the classic texts of Western
civilization provides access to “a tradition before which all are equal” (p. 61). As such, the recent
postmodern argument that knowledge, as a socially constructed phenomenon, has normative
implications is “as pernicious as it is common, implying as it does that political democracy is
essentially inimical to authority, tradition, and rigor in its cultural institutions.” (Kimball, 1990, p. 6).
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Based upon this essentialism, a fixed canon becomes important for two reasons: not only is it a
democratic source of information, it is objectively good. That is, the canon creates democracy and is
democracy personified.
Sykes (1990) reflected this argument while also invoking the conservative bogeyman of
postmodernism:
. . . it is in the Western tradition that we find the origins of democratic society, of the
focus on individual worth and human dignity, and of aspirations for human freedom.
[. . .] To lose that legacy through a curriculum of enforced cultural amnesia is to
deconstruct an entire civilization. (p. 15)
Simply put, conservative critiques of higher education attempt to conflate political liberalism and
postmodernism in order to undermine faith in the academic enterprise. In asserting that without a
“central body of shared knowledge at the heart of university education,” we have entered into a
society where we can no longer be sure of what knowledge a given person possesses, Sykes (1988)
identified the crux of the traditionalist reaction to postmodernism (p. 82). This framing presupposes
that human understanding has a fundamentally synthetic quality—that is, we want to reach common
ground. As such, for conservative critics, any attempt to dissolve consensus is inherently
problematic. Often, these critiques are levied at groups of students and intellectuals who have been
traditionally marginalized by the academic establishment. D’Souza (1991) wrote that: “The problem
with the idea of ethnically determined ‘perspectives’ is that it condemns us to an intellectual and
moral universe in which people of different background can never really hope to understand each
other” (p. 186). Likewise, Kimball (1990) argued that “radical” feminism represents “single biggest
challenge to the canon as traditionally conceived” (p. 15).
When conservative critiques of higher education shift from advocating for a return to an
essentialized curriculum toward attacking particular minoritized groups, the conservative
commentators make clear the stakes of the higher education-based battlegrounds in the Culture
Wars. Colleges and universities function as powerful culture bearers that cannot be ideologically
neutral; even as conservative commentators argue for that possibility, they also acknowledge it
cannot be so, and instead advocate for individual choice in the matter. For example, Buckley (1951)
described the college as a battlefield of competing ideologies:
With the stage thus set, the college student enters as a spectator in the arena in which
the multifarious forces fight it out. Using the tools that his academic training has
provided him, he is to pick out truth and to shovel aside error. It is important that
his choice be his own, for it is all the more valuable to him if there has been no
exterior persuasion on behalf of one or the other protagonist. (p. 145)
This same choice rhetoric is the basis for conservative commentators’ objections to being exposed to
ideological positions with which they disagree. Kimball (1990), Sykes (1990), and D’Souza (1991) all
decried the pernicious influence of the “victims’ revolution,” which they contend has led to
unwarranted diversification of the curriculum on racial, ethnic, sexual, religious, and gendered lines.
One representative passage comes from Kimball (1990):
The political dimension of this assault on the humanities shows itself nowhere more
clearly than in the attempt to restructure the curriculum on the principle of equal
time. More and more, one sees the traditional literary canon ignored as various
interest groups demand that there be more women’s literature for feminists, black
literature for blacks, gay literature for homosexuals, and so on. The idea of literary
quality that transcends the contingencies of race, gender, and the like or that
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transcends the ephemeral attractions of popular entertainment is excoriated as naïve,
deliberately deceptive, or worse. (p. xv)
Highlighting the marginality of under-represented groups within the academy through the use of
terms like interest groups, Kimball (1990) and others suggested that topics that would make the
curriculum more representative are inappropriate on the basis of democratic power. They simply do
not represent the majority point of view. As such, it becomes easy to dismiss contrary points of view
as “ideologically motivated assaults on the intellectual and moral substance of our culture” (Kimball,
1990, p. xviii) and higher education institutions as ethical wastelands characterized by “the
fragmentation and incoherence of the curriculum; the nihilism that passes for the humanities; the
politicization of both scholarship and the classroom; and the darkening shadow of intolerance and
intimidation reflected in official attempts to limit free speech” (p. ix).

Using Academia’s Post-Truth Ideology to Combat Contemporary Post-Truth
Rhetoric
In this article, we have shown that: the United States has entered a post-truth era
characterized by deep distrust of colleges and universities as well as deep investment in the
importance of higher education; scientists and the general public utilize thinking of t/Truth in
markedly different ways; Rortian pragmatism nicely encapsulates the natural state of scientific
inquiry; distrust of expert judgment is widespread; and this distrust of experts is reflected in
conservative critiques of higher education. This section advances the argument that the problem set
created by the interrelationships among these observations is difficult, if not impossible, to
disentangle. Therefore, we suggest that the easiest way of addressing the problem of the post-truth
era is to simply stop predicating the value of natural and social scientific inquiry on the idea of
t/Truth. Indeed, we would like to advocate against using either term; rather, we put forth the term
utility as described by James (1907/1981, 1909/1978) and reframed by Rorty (1990, 1999) as a more
versatile term.
Although abandoning a t/Truth standard might seem problematic, there is ample evidence
that scientists already do so in practice (e.g., Fine, 1996; Latour, 2010). Additionally, a debate
between Richard Rorty and Pascal Engel (Rorty & Engel, 2007) forecasts how such an effort would
play out in practice while also providing a brief discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of this
approach. In this debate, Engel began by critiquing the pragmatic conception of truth: t/Truth has
no explanatory use; a correspondence theory of representation is inherently false; realism and antirealism debates are hollow; justification is a preferable epistemological aim to truth; and that this
formulation does not diminish our ability to speak of causality or values, but that doing so must be
predicated on contingency. Although it is quite clear from the framing he gave his arguments that
Engel expected vociferous objection, Rorty simply agrees with his statement of pragmatism’s view
of truth. Instead, Rorty’s response indicated the utility of this approach in redirecting nonproductive discourses: his lack of argument is designed to suggest that the fundamental nature of the
debate is moot. For Rorty, academic arguments about the nature of t/Truth obscure the critical issue
of what people actually do, which matters far more. He summarized this position in two ways:
[1] To give meaning to an expression, all you have to do is use it in a more or less
predictable manner—situate it within a network of predictable inferences.
[paragraph] The question that matters to us pragmatists is not whether a vocabulary
possesses meaning or not, whether it raises real or unreal problems, but whether the
resolution of that debate will have an effect in practice, whether it will be useful. [. . .]

Introductions to rethinking education policy and methodology in a post-truth era

13

For the fundamental thesis of pragmatism is William James’s assertion that if a
debate has not practical significance, then it has no philosophical significance.
[2] . . . our responsibilities are exclusively toward other human beings, not
toward “reality.”[. . .] Trying never to have anything but true beliefs will not lead us
to do anything differently than if we simply try our best to justify our beliefs to
ourselves and to others. (Rorty & Engel, 2007, pp. 34, 41, and 45)
Following this line of reasoning, we suggest that academics should embrace Rortian pragmatism’s
work on objectivity and follow it to its logical end (Rorty, 1990, 1999). Doing so requires that
academics abandon any essentialist positions—foremost among them, the belief in truths or a Truth
that is verifiable, communicable, or even useful.
In making this argument, we acknowledge that we live in a time of posts—ranging from
postmodernism to poststructuralism to post-truth. All these posts (except post-truth) advocate that
we abandon the very idea of Truth. Although quite different from the public use of post-trust,
academia’s time of posts reaches much the same conclusion: we lack a meaningful way to converse
with one another in stable, consistent ways. Instead, consistent with the tenets of Rorty’s
pragmatism, we advocate adopting utility as the standard for clarifying the value and quality of
academic work. Given the demonstrable political utility of this distrust of expert judgment, a central
focus on utility not only would serve to reflect the actual practice of scientific inquiry but also would
make clear to the public the precise way that they should consider our work. Although abstract
judgments of truth might not be accessible, consistent with Rorty’s pragmatism, academics—
particularly those in applied fields like education—should be able to communicate why and how
their work matters. Communicating utility would separate conservative critiques of higher education
from broader concerns over expert judgment via the substitution of judgement criteria more readily
accessible to laypeople (e.g., Porter, 1995).

Implications
We currently live in a tumultuous time: we have a U.S. president who vilifies the traditional
media, declares most critiques or opposing opinions as fake news, and is a proponent of alternative
facts. This rhetoric in which facts and truth are readily dismissed echoes throughout society and is
discernible in the ways that people think about and talk about such issues as the value of college,
faculty politics, and whether or not the Culture Wars are to blame for our current predicament. As
shown earlier, distrust of academics, experts, and intellectuals is nothing new in American history
(Hofstadter, 1963). But by reviewing both the historiography of expert judgment and the role of
post-truth in social science, we were able to highlight the place that conservative attacks on higher
education hold in that long history. We close by describing implications including: (a) a
historiographic model of expert judgment within the research university; and (b) a call for scholars
to acknowledge the conflation of facts and values in their work—that is, its post-truth nature.
The historiography and theoretical discussions have many implications for the ways that the
academy can assert itself against both post-truth rhetoric and conservative attacks. This
historiography highlights the creation and formation of experts and professionals in this country—
individuals who exert a remarkable amount of power and decision-making over our everyday lives.
This historiography also highlights the sources of popular distrust of expert judgment: reactions
against perceived elitism, the country’s history as a democracy, and the distance and obfuscation that
takes place between experts and the people whose lives are affected by their expertise. Taken
together, this historiographic model implies that more transparency in expertise is warranted.
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Professional, experts, and academics need to be more transparent about their work—not just their
conclusions or the work’s utility, but the processes behind it, as well as their own assumptions about
the nature of truth.
In creating this transparency, scholars must acknowledge the conflation of facts and values
in their own work. This acknowledgement includes interrogating assumptions about objectivity, lack
of bias, and dispassionate inquiry inherent in academic work—indeed, a belief in objectivity or
postpositivism is in itself a value. Rather than continue to cling to objectivity as a golden standard,
academics should instead consider the concept of utility. It is important to note that we are not
arguing that every piece of academic research must be readily useful in some transactional way.
Rather, we suggest judgments of utility are inherently contextual; that is, prior utility judgements in a
given realm (e.g., engineering, philosophy, film studies, medicine) provide the criteria by which the
utility of new knowledge might be assessed. As Kuhn (1996) has shown, the scientific process
typically does function in this way—even it is sometimes framed otherwise. Therefore, we argue that
if academics were more transparent about the processes behind their research and are able to
articulate the utility of their work—why their work matters, what intellectual history they are
incrementally modifying, and how it might impact everyday life—the academy as a whole might
garner more support and have a more ready response to critiques about the utility of a college
education.
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